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Europe and the USA
The theme expressed by the title of this article1 has
assumed a new significance in recent years. Just how
significant might be gleaned from an experience I
recently had in Washington. At the end of my own
remarks and the discussion that followed, the
conclusion urged on me by my American friends was
that the South - indeed the rest of the world - should
be realistic about the prospects for political change in
Washington and, being realistic, should accept that on
North-South issues no progress was likely over the
remaining two years of the life of the present
Administration; our effort, they felt, should be most
concerned with working for the period thereafter.
That was a shattering conclusion, especially as those
who shared this view were not in any sense either 'wet
liberals' or 'radical freaks'; they were serious
thoughtful Americans, some of them Republicans,
gravely concerned over present policies in their
country and their implications for themselves and the
rest of the world.
Were they right? Are these the terms on which we must
build the prospects for political change in what is left
of the 1980s? My own natural optimism, but even
more my faith in the potential of people in working
democracies to curb the instincts of the politicians
they have put in office, leads me away from such
counsels of despair. But I am enough of a realist to
recognise that the matter is sufficiently in doubt for us
to take the gloomy prognosis seriously. At the very
least, we must cater for the possibility that over the
next year and, who knows, perhaps over the next five,
the United States may not bean influence for progress,
but an influence for stagnation or, worse still, for
retrogession in North-South relations. It is one of the
scenarios for which prescriptions on Europe and the
South in the 1 980s have to cater. But I would not wish
to imply that it is only negative American positions
that constrain Europe from pursuing with the South a
bold and enlightened programme of change. Europe
has not been straining at the leash of Group B
positions. As one looks to the prospects of Europe and
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the South in the 1980s one must look hard at Europe's
role as part of the North and ask whether the part is
more likely than the whole to be a true partner of the
South.
Last year marked the end of some eight years of
North-South 'dialogue' - perhaps the most intensive
process of consultation on cooperation (or indeed
anything else) in all human history. Yet I venture to
assert that no year since 1945 has started so badly, in
so many ways, for so many people, in so many
countries, as did 1982. Perhaps that should not
surprise us, because we know that, in truth, there has
been no real dialogue. The South has not been
blameless in this; but, with few exceptions, it really was
not even the intention of the North that there should
be real dialogue. The North (and Europe within it) is
not evil; its negotiators are not inhuman. Why then the
cruel innocence of its indifference to an ineffectual
dialogue? The answer lies, I believe, in the perception
of our world as so many separate states for each of
which the supreme duty is to national prosperity
secured through an adversary system of international
relations and sanctified at the altar of sovereignty. It is
a perception from an era that has passed, but it is a
perception that has carried over - in Europe as
elsewhere.
Is there any doubt of the realities that have followed:
the urgency of halting the unravelling process taking
place in so many areas of human cooperation in which
we had made gains; the need for a wholly new
intellectual framework for the internationalism of the
1980s; and the dangers that loom if we fail to meet
these challenges? Can we seriously examine the
prospects for political change in terms of relations
between Europe and the South without examining
first the prospects for that fusion of power and wisdom
which human survival on any tolerable basis now
demands? Is it too late, after all, to make the dialogue a
real one, with Europe more conscious now than when
it began that development is not just the concern of the
two-thirds of mankind that is the South, but of all the
world; that man's needs are mutual and their
satisfaction ajoint interest of all people; that the status
quo now threatens all countries and an ineffectual
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dialogue that merely preserves it hurts rich and poor
alike; that time could be short to shape the future
before we are overwhelmed by it. It was not lightly that
the Brandt Commission urged that if the world fails to
'become stronger by becoming a just and humane
society' it will move towards its own destruction. Does
Europe acknowledge - will it help to meet - this
essential need to manage our survival?
The Growing Challenge
What these questions ask is whether there is a will in
Europe to respond to current challenges? Among
them are the challenges posed by a world economy
that is sick and national economies that are dying. The
dangers in the financial and monetary fields, and
particularly in relation to international debt, are
simply staggering. At the end of 1980 the total
outstanding external debt of oil-importing developing
countries is likely to have been around £600 bn, of
which just about three-fifths some $350 bn would
have been raised at floating rates of interest and with
relatively short maturities, a combination that has
now imposed crushing debt service burdens. On
$200 bn, a 1 per cent rise in interest rate increases
interest charges by $2 bn. Debt service payments for
1981 far exceeded $100 bn. These developments are as
worrying to creditors as to debtors - to Europe as to
the South. Current trends cannot continue without
precipitating a crisis, either through default by a major
borrower and the domino effect of default on the
whole international credit system, or through
intolerable burdens of adjustment imposed on the
weakest economies in the absence of international
support for their minimal financing needs.
As might be expected, the low income countries have
been able to borrow little from the commercial banks.
Their needs are the most urgent in both economic and
human terms. As raw material producers - in the 12
month period ending June 1982 - they saw prices
decline for 14 out of the 18 commodities of major
export interest to them, the fall ranging from 2 to
58 per cent. Their terms of trade have declined
sharply. They have had to cut even essential imports,
which means not only less food and other basic
necessities but also less machinery, equipment, spare
parts and fertilisers to maintain production. For them,
then, there is little prospect of an early end to present
economic distress, and the present fragile and
uncertain recovery has little significance for them.
These countries, for whom growth has virtually
stopped, have about one-quarter of the world's
population. They include most of the 750 million
people in the world defined as the absolute poor. This
is a time, it might be thought, when multilateral
institutions like the World Bank would be most
assiduous in supporting such countries - particularly
through the concessionary window of IDA. Instead,
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IDA now faces a threat to its very survival - a threat
led, admittedly, by the United States.
Meanwhile, protectionism provides a striking example
of how limited are the lessons we have learned. It is
well established that because of prevailing linkages,
protectionism forfeits many more jobs than it secures;
and that, emerging out of the fight against inflation, it
in the end fuels inflation itself. Few governments
would dissent from this; for most, 'free trade' is
quintessential doctrine. Yet protectionism is on the
march. Half a century after the events of the 1930s it
should be self-evident that at the end of that road lies
damnation; that there must be an international
dimension to the battle against inflation. The World
Economic Conference in 1933 - chaired in London
by Ramsay Macdonald and attended even then by 64
countries - came too late to assist in averting the
depression, and was too half-hearted to arrest
economic disorder. Must that history of myopia and
tardiness be repeated in the l980s?
The world economic scene is not one we can be
complacent about. Yet in spite of the worsening
situation, Western Economic Summits have come and
gone without that sense of urgency for bold and
coordinated international action that is clearly
needed. Some positive statements have been made on
the North-South dialogue but we have all learned to
look for the careful words of qualification and they are
always there - inserted, perhaps at the instance of
one, but available to all. It is difficult to avoid the view
that the present problems are too deep seated to
respond to the kind of approaches which have been
coming from the Western Economic Summits and the
domestic policy orientations of many of the major
countries, including some in Europe.
A Role for the EEC
In all these areas of deterioration in the prospects for
development what can Europe do to bring about
improvement? It is not feasible to contemplate a
regime of relations between Europe and the South in
the 1980s which leave the world framework out of
account; which leaves North-South issues stagnating
on the periphery, while Europe and the South - or
parts of it - pursue the illusion of patchwork change.
But Europe is more than the sum of its several parts. It
is the Community as well, and there is a dimension
here that certainly enlarges the prospects for political
change. Whatever the narrow national focus of
particular member states, the Community has a more
direct interest in the North-South dialogue than the
United States. It is more dependent on the South for
energy and other raw materials and as a market for its
manufactured goods. And Europe is also more closely
tied regionally and historically to the Third World. As
a recent Commission Report puts it, 'of the
industrialised countries, Europe is probably the one
with the biggest immediate economic interest in
reduction of constraints caused by scarcities and of
unstable modes of behaviour' [EEC 1981]. Historical
and regional ties provide both the need and
opportunity for the intensification of Europe-South
relations and the institutional arrangements for such
intensification in the form of the Lomé Convention
are in place.
The practical function of administering the Lomé
Convention has given tremendous scope to the
Directorate-General for Development (DG 8).
Through the earlier leadership of Claude Cheysson
and now the great personal commitment of his
successor Edgard Pisani, DG 8 is well placed to
develop further its creative role in North-South policy.
In member countries, aid ministries are not usually as
well placed relative to other ministries as DG 8 is to
other Directorates-General in developing and coordi-
nating North-South policy. Institutionally, therefore,
the EEC is equipped to play a leadership role in North-
South policy formulation. I know, and have
complained before, of the propensity of the EEC to
settle positions on Nor;h-South issues at the lowest
level of national response in the Community. In the
Lomé Convention, however, the EEC already has an
economic cooperation arrangement with 63 developing
countries involving significant trade and aid links; this
surely provides the experience and institutional
infrastructure for intensifying its global relations with
the South along progressive lines even if it entails
dragging reluctant Community members to more
forward positions. Can the Commission, in particular,
acquire greater influence in the determination of the
Community's position on global issues - at least as an
input into Group B positions?
The Lomé Convention offered a model for wider
North-South cooperation. That was much in our
minds as we negotiated it with a very cautious Europe.
Lomé's strength was that it was not an act of charity;
there was much in it for the EEC. Its weakness was
that it was a bundle of promises; and not all have been
fulfilled. But even while it disappointed in performance
its potential lay revealed. The Convention has now
provided eight years of operational experience on
which Europe and the ACP can build in terms of more
effective cooperation and joint action. Such improve-
ment would itself be a contribution to North-South
cooperation, a point that deserves attention as
preparatory work starts on Lomé III.
But Lomé itself cannot be the main instrument for
establishing relations between Europe and the South.
Although about half the number of Third World states
are members of Lomé, the Convention is much less
significant in terms of population - covering only 15
per cent of the people of the developing world, even
excluding China. Also, it excludes many developing
countries which because of their population, size or
income levels, are of significant economic and political
importance. On the other side, some EEC countries
have a strong interest in developing closer economic
relations with non-ACP countries. Europe-South
cooperation cannot therefore be confined within the
parameters of Lomé as it stands.
But there is significant scope for coordinated
European policy development in relation to non-AC P
countries and this is an area in which an active Europe-
South policy of major significance could be developed,
extrapolating, as it were, from the Lomé experience.
Such thinking is already in the air; encouraged, of
course, by Europe's dependence on raw materials
from the South, a dependence (an element of
interdependence is more accurate) which the Americans
have not yet come to acknowledge, despite prevailing
trends. But these are not the only priority areas.
Concessional flows are of tremendous importance to
low income and specially disadvantaged countries
now facing critical, perhaps terminal, financing
problems. The maintenance of flows from IDA and
adequate resources at the IMF for sustaining a high
level of balance of payments support is now a matter
of great urgency. Those needs must give Europe
significant incentives for action. Morality alone
demands it; but for those who feel this is not
compelling enough, the fact is that they are being
constantly reinforced by the hard-headed realities of
mutual need.
Quite apart from economic arguments about the
markets of the future, the political implications of the
interface between poverty and population growth are
becoming unavoidable. One element of the price the
world pays for underdevelopment is a million extra
people every five days and the prospect of a planet of
15 billion in the next century. On an over-populated
planet, as in an over-populated city, there is no
insulated world, no sanctuary, no final refuge from the
terror of the proverbial 'box of matches' in the hands
of the dispossessed and despairing. Already, a swollen
tide of refugees warns us that human misery cannot be
quarantined. Our global society clearly faces the
danger of being overwhelmed by income disparity and
endemic poverty. Can the remaining 20 per cent,
including much of Europe, face that prospect with
equanimity - sitting smugly on surpluses and nuclear
silos?
Aid levels for Community member countries would
surely be a suitable area for European policy
development. One almost feels ashamed to have to
urge again a firm commitment from Europe as a whole
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to the adoption of a time-bound 0.7 per cent aid target
by member countries. Ashamed and inadequate
because, as we face the 1980s, are these still the limits
of our horizons? It is now 36 years ago that the
Marshall Plan was unveiled. How simple, and yet how
pure, was the perception with which it began.
After two years of post-war stalemate Marshall had
said: 'It they (the Europeans) could agree collectively
and comprehensively on what they needed, America
would do what it could to help'. The Europeans did
agree. The Americans acted. The politicians had the
support of business, the labour movement, and the
churches. The various beneficiaries included British
socialists, French central planners and industrial
unions in West Germany. In the result, a basically
hawkish Secretary of Defence, James Forrestal, could
urge on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
it is 'infinitely cheaper to defend ourselves by
economic means'.
I do not ignore the dissimilarities between Europe
(even in 1947) and the South now, but are not the
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similarities in the mutual needs of North and South
today and the Americans and Europe in the post-war
years too dangerously close to be ignored? And even if
they are not, cannot the vision of the Marshall Plan
inspire Europe which was its main beneficiary then
collectively to urge on the West a similar act of
imagination and self-interested generosity to that
which inspired the Plan? I urge people to think upon it.
But let me end where I began - with realism. If we
accept the despair of my Washington evening, nearly
all I have said reduces to a rather stark question: not
merely whether Europe has the will to act, but whether
it has the will to do so without the United States or, by
so doing, to bring the United States along. And what
this really means is, can Europe overcome its sense of
dependency on the Americans at least in the interest of
recalling the United States to its own traditions of
compassion, generosity and internationalism?
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